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Though the concept of in loco parentis as applied
to higher education lost its legal status during the
late 1960s and early 1970s, many higher education
authorities believe that the underlying philosophy of
in loco parentis is re-emerging.

This paper examines

the history of the in loco parentis doctrine in
American higher education.

By drawing on a number of

sources, the fluctuating legal and philosophical
applications of the doctrine are traced from their
origins in colonial America to their status in the
higher education system of today.
Historical Foundations
For most of the history of higher education in
America, the concept of in loco parentis (literally,
"in place of the parent") defined the relationship
between administration and student.

The origin and

development of this relationship is not surprising
given the nature of early American colleges.

As

Commanger (1976) described it:
The college was designed, in the 18th and much of
the 19th century, for very young men.
It was in
many respects what our preparatory schools are
now . . . And this leads to (another) quality
which distinguishes the American college from the
university: the practice of in loco parentis by
the college authorities. This was logical if
students were indeed children.
(p. 4)
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This environment led to an almost absolute control
of students by faculty and administration.

Admittance

and dismissal, course of study, living arrangements,
appearance, social and religious activities, as well as
most other aspects of student life, were dictated by
the college administration.

Students were simply given

one choice:

either abide by the rules or face summary

discipline.

The college had the final (and often the

only) say in regulatory matters.
As both a philosophy and a practical means of
governance, in loco parentis thrived in most American
higher education environments until the latter half of
the 19th century.

It was at this time that American

colleges began to shift from their English heritage
toward a system of higher education based upon the
German universities.

McGrath (1970) stated:

Into the middle of the 19th century
American colleges retained their English tradition
of cloistered paternalism; and for every whipping
they administered, their students could retaliate
with obstinacy. But with the trend of American
higher education toward German ideals after the
Civil War--that of scientific research, of
graduate instruction, and of intellectual
concern rather than pietistic obedience-the existing colleges began to relinquish
their severe patriarchal supervision . . . (p. 18)
While the faculty and administration of many
American colleges and universities began to emulate the
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Ge rman mode l of highe r e ducation, the characteristics
of the Ame rican stude nt-body be came more and more
dive rge nt from its Europe an counte rpart.

Unlike most

Old World unive rsitie s, which continue d to admit a
re lative ly se le ct numbe r of stude nts, Ame rican higher
e ducation be gan to attract stude nts in increasing
numbe rs.

Trow {1988) note d that in 1880, England had

four unive rsitie s for a population of 23 million.

At

the same time , the 3 million re side nts of the state of
Ohio we re se rve d by 37 institutions of higher
e ducation.

The Unite d State s e nte re d the Civil War

with about 250 colle ge s.

According to Trow, by 1910

the U.S. had ne arly a thousand colle ge s and
unive rsitie s with we ll ove r 300,000 stude nts.

This was

at a time whe n France had 16 unive rsitie s with a total
e nrollme nt of about 40,000, ne arly the numbe r of
Ame rican faculty me mbe rs alone.
As the she e r numbe r of stude nts incre ase d during
the 1800s, so, too, did the dive rsity of the students.
No longe r we re stude nts sole ly male s in the ir mid-to
late -te e ns.

Diffe ring mixture s of age , ge nde r, race,

and life -e xpe rie nce s be gan to pe ppe r the formerly
homoge ne ous stude nt-bodie s.

Such a situation lends

itse lf to a dichotomy re garding the application of the
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in loco parentis doctrine.

Older, more mature

students, some having lived independently of their
parents for lengthy periods of time, began to make
their way into higher education.

The idea of an

institution acting with parental authority became
harder to justify, much less enforce.

Yet, the

increasing number of students meant there was need for
efficient governance of students.

There was also the

issue of the mixing of the sexes.

These factors

supported the continuance of in loco parentis as the
status quo.

And, in fact, the status quo did prevail.

The ripples of change could be faintly seen, but would
not be felt for another three generations.
Affirmation in the Courts
In loco parentis did not stand on its espoused
philosophical merits alone.
judicial support as well.

It was bolstered by
The in loco parentis

doctrine has foundations in early English common law.
This doctrine, while implicit in the supervision of
students since the founding of the earliest American
colleges, was first applied in a legal sense to
American higher education in 1913.

The court of

Appeals of Kentucky, in ruling for the College in Gott
v. Berea College, stated:
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College authorities stand in loco parentis
concerning the physical and moral welfare and
mental training of the pupils, and we are unable
to see why, to that end, they may not make any
rule or regulation for the government or for the
same purpose.
(Gott v. Berea College, 156 KY.
376, 161 s.w. 204, 1913)
It is ironic to note that the case against Berea
College was not brought to court by a disgruntled
student.

It was a local businessman who, feeling that

the college's rules against students patronizing his
establishment amounted to an economic death-sentence
against him, challenged the authority of school
administrators to establish rules regarding
extra-curricular behavior.

The decision against J.

s.

Gott set a legal precedent that prevailed for almost 50
years.
Regarding this decision, Kaplin (1985) wrote, "In
placing the educational institution in the parents'
shoes, the doctrine permitted the institution to exert
almost untrammeled authority over students' lives"

(p. 4).
According to Kaplin, students were also prohibited
from laying claim to constitutional rights in the
college environment.

Noting that the U.S. Constitution

had no application in private education, he addressed
the issue of public institutions with reference to
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Hamilton v. Regents of the University of California,
293 U.S. 245 (1934).

In this case, the court upheld an

order that student conscientious objectors must take
military training as a condition of attending the
institution.

Kaplin wrote that with this ruling the

courts accepted the idea that attendance at a public
postsecondary institution was a privilege and not a
right.

As a privilege, attendance was open to

termination for whatever reasons the institution deemed
fit.

On campus, at least, students were relegated to

the status of minors, free to exercise only those
rights which the host institution was willing to give
them.
As had happened some 80 years earlier, a war
served to mark a change in American higher education.
Just as higher education had seen an increase in
numbers following the Civil War, Post-World War II
America saw an increase in postsecondary enrollment.
Kaplin stated that the GI Bill expansion of the late
1940s and early 1950s, and the "baby-boomers" of the
1960s, brought enormous growth to higher education in
America.

In 1940 there were about 1.5 million degree

students in the U.S.

By 1955 the number had grown to

more than 2.5 million and by 1965 students numbered
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more than 5.5 million.

As with the post-bellum growth

of the previous century, the significance of this
growth went beyond the mere magnitude of the numbers.
Kaplin wrote:
As new social, economic, and ethnic groups began
to enter this broadened world of postsecondary
education, the traditional processes of selection,
admission, and academic acculturation began to
break down . . . For many of the new students as
well older patterns of deference to tradition and
authority became a thing of the past--perhaps an
irrelevant or even consciously repudiated past.
The emergence of the student-veteran; the
loosening of the "lock-step" pattern of
educational preparation . . . And, finally, the
lowered age of majority--all combined to make
the in loco parentis relationship between
institution and student less and less tenable.
To many students higher education became an
economic or professional necessity, and some, such
as the GI Bill veterans, had cause to view it as
an earned right.
(p. 6)
Despite these changes in American higher
education, in loco parentis was still entrenched on
campuses across the country, and the courts continued
to rule consistently in its favor.

As late as 1959,

courts were ruling that higher education was exempt
from constitutional guarantees regarding the rights of
their students.

It was in that year that the Second

Court of Appeals, in Steier v. N.Y. State Education
Commission (271 F.2d 150, 2d Cir., 1959), upheld the
existence of in loco parentis while denying a student's
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due process and right of free speech.

The court ruled

that attendance at a public institution was a privilege
granted by the state, leaving the federal courts with
no jurisdiction over the granting of those privileges
(Hendrickson & Gibbs, 1986).
This ruling, however, appeared to be among the
last adjudicated victories for in loco parentis.

Only

two years later a series of court decisions began that
hammered away at the legal foundation on which in loco
parentis had stood for over 300 years.

Though the

doctrine would not be completely leveled by the courts
until the 1970s, the first blows were powerful enough
to leave it on very shaky ground.

As Ardaiolo (1983)

put it, "The death knell of the judicial doctrine of
in loco parentis on college campuses was sounded in
1961" (p. 15).
Reversing Trends
It was in 1961 that the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed a lower court's ruling regarding the
rights of students on campus.

The case, Dixon v.

Alabama State Board of Education (186 F.Supp. 945,
1960), involved the expulsion of students who took part
in an off-campus "sit-in," among other civil rights
activities.

At issue was whether this summary
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expulsion violated Fourteenth Amendment "due process"
requirements (Millington, 1979).

The lower court cited

precedent, stating:
The courts have consistently upheld the validity
of regulations that have the effect of reserving
to the college the right to dismiss students at
any time for any reason . . . . The prevailing
law does not require the presentation of former
charges or a hearing prior to expulsion by the
school authorities.
(Dixon v. Alabama, 1960,
p. 951)
The appeals court overruled, writing:

"The

question . . . is whether due process requires notice
and some opportunities for hearing before students at a
tax-supported college are expelled.

We answer that

question in the affirmative" (Dixon v. Alabama State
Board of Education, 294 F.2d 150, 1961, p. 150).
This ruling signaled a new era in American higher
education.

It was with the landmark Dixon case that

the student-institutional relationship changed from one
of in loco parentis to a new one based on the
Constitution (Hendrickson & Gibbs, 1986).

As a result,

students emerged with a new status on American
campuses.

Under most circumstances students moved from

second-class citizenship under the law to being
recognized as having enforceable constitutional rights.
The court in the Dixon case rejected the idea that
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attendance at state institutions was a privilege, and
implicitly rejected the in loco parentis concept
(Kaplin, 1985).
As students began to find support in the judicial
system, other factors began to come into play that
would ensure the continuation of legal challenges aimed
at campus administration and authority.

The civil

rights movement of the 1960s forced authorities in all
sectors of society to undertake both a legal and, at
times, a philosophical change.

Individual rights under

the Constitution became the watchword.

The

responsibility to see that these rights were protected
on campus fell to the administrators (Ardaiolo, 1983).
The legal weakening of in loco parentis emboldened
student activists to push harder for student rights.
Besides using the courts, these activists advocated
social protests as a means to challenge administrative
authority.

In writing about the distinction German

higher education made between academic freedom for
faculty, and freedom for students to arrange their own
academic life, Millington (1979) stated, "American
college students of course began demanding such a
distinction, very dramatically, during the turbulent
decade of the sixties" (p. 8).
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The invocation of "student power" was heard on
campuses across the nation.

For student power

advocates, the basis for authority on campus was to
arise from one fundamental principal--those who must
obey the rules should make the rules (Schwartz, 1967).
This principle was echoed by those who called for the
democratization of the campus, allowing for students to
collectively decide rules and regulations (Kramer,
1968).

Proponents of student self-government argued

that the way to learn personal responsibility was to
allow students to practice those responsibilities
(Powell, 1971).
The student-power movement sought to go beyond
court rulings as a means of effecting change.

Schwartz

wrote:
student power should not be argued on legal
grounds.
It is not a legal principle.
Students who argue for "rights" usually fail
to explore the reasons for rights.
In a
university, a right should spring from a
premise of education, not a decision of the
court, although the two may coincide.
(p.5}
The actions taken to secure those rights did, however,
often culminate in judicial proceedings.

It was the

many court decisions that helped to propagate student
rights and a backing away from in loco parentis.
victory on a single campus could only be applied

A
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locally.

A fight won in the courts had nation-wide

implications.
Another blow against in loco parentis came in 1971
with the ratification of the Twenty-sixth Amendment,
which lowered the voting age to 18.

As a result, many

states lowered the age of majority for many or all
legal purposes.

Most higher education students were

now recognized legally as adults, with all the
attendant rights and responsibilities.
Much of the reform that had taken place in the
previous two decades was summarized in a 1979 court
case, Bradshaw v. Rawlings.

In ruling that an injured

student failed to show that the college owed him a
legal duty of care, the court stated:
There was a time when college administrators and
faculties assumed a role in loco parentis . . . A
dramatic reapportionment of responsibilities and
social interests (has taken) place . . . At one
time exercising their rights and duties in loco
parentis, colleges were able to impose strict
regulations. But today students vigorously claim
the right to define and regulate their own lives.
(Bradshaw v. Rawlings, 612 F.2d 135, 1979, p. 139;
Kaplin, 1985, p. 59)
After being continually struck down by the courts,
it appeared that the in loco parentis doctrine had
finally succumb.

This long-standing relationship
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between student and institution was declared to be
legally dead.
Dead, But Not Gone?
There were those, however, who felt that the
philosophical spirit, if not the legal body, of in loco
parentis lived on.

Changes in the law often fail to

produce changes in behavior.

While in loco parentis

was no longer sufficient to explain the
student-institutional relationship, especially in the
area of student rights, dicta in many court cases
indicated a reluctance to totally abandon the concept
(Conrath, 1976; Hendrickson & Gibbs, 1985).
Commanger (1976) wrote that while colleges were
abandoning in loco parentis, in many respects they
still treated their students as if they were children.
He cited the lack of academic preparation among
incoming students as one reason for the retention of
the parenting function on campuses across the nation.
Pitts (1980) stated that in loco parentis had
resurfaced as a variety of student services under the
concept of student development, defined by Miller and
Prince (1976) as "the application of human development
concepts in postsecondary settings so that everyone
involved can master increasingly complex tasks, achieve
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self-direction, and become interdependent" (p. 3}.

As

Pitts saw it, the concern for student development is,
by its nature, a parenting function.

He wrote that any

differences between past and present are manifested
more in the method of parenting rather than a shift
away from a parenting function, adding that "the legal
status of in loco parentis . . . is of less
significance than the question of how colleges are
currently seeking to fulfill the basically parental
function of fostering the growth of the whole student"
(p. 21).

Ballou and Gregory (1986} also saw a connection
between the contemporary student development concept
and the traditional in loco parentis doctrine.

They

stated:
While a strict, 1950s-type interpretation of
in loco parentis may be dead, what has arisen from
its ashes, like a phoenix, is a new form and
meaning of the term. This new definition, almost
an in loco parentis reinvented, includes both a
broader legal responsibility and a new nurturing
and developmental function only vaguely called for
in the past.
(p. 30}
Ballou and Gregory cited the increasing legal,
ethical and developmental demands being placed on
institutions.

They note that under these conditions

"Parenting becomes not just a secondary task, but the
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foremost task of student affairs professionals" (p.
3 0) •
There are new implications resulting from court
rulings which view the relationship between the
institution and the student as contractual.

While this

relationship has long been accepted at private
colleges, it has also come to describe the public
school domain as well.
question:

Strickland (1965) posed the

"If a college has a contractual right to

regulate student morals in some respects, does it have
a duty to do so?" (p. 338).

Case law at that time

indicated that institutions were not bound by such a
duty.

A decade later, however, contractual obligations

and consumer rights began to forge a new relationship
between student and institution.

Within this

relationship the student is seen as a consumer of
education, with the institution supplying the product
of education.

As such, the consumer has a right to

receive what was paid for (Fowler, 1984; Hollander,
Young, & Gehring, 1985).

If parental functions and

responsibilities are seen as part of the implied
contract, it is incumbent upon the institution to
fulfill those functions {Morrill & Mount, 1986).
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This notion was echoed by Zirkel and Reichner
(1986), who wrote that "along with the delegated
discretion for the broad purposes of education school
authorities are clothed with corresponding duties" (p.
279).

The implication comes from those duties expected

of the college, and the implied contractual
responsibilities.

This emphasis on institutional

responsibility was also reflected by Gibbs and
Szablewicz (1987).

They wrote:

During the 1980s, the college-student
relationship began to show signs of change
yet again.
Students began to expect their
colleges to get them jobs, provide them with
tuition assistance and establish their careers.
Further, the students demanded protections-protections against attack, against harm, and
against injuries sustained often due to their
own carelessness.
In short, students began to
ask colleges to take care of them much like their
parents did.
(p. 453)
Fass (1986) stated that these expectations have
led both students and parents to demand that colleges
exert administrative authority in order to increase the
chances of success during and after graduation.
According to Fass, colleges are "being asked to provide
levels of support, control, and protection that bear a
striking resemblance to some of the in loco parentis
expectations of the past'' (p. 36).
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In contrast to those who sought to shake off the
yoke of in loco parentis, some students have appeared
favorable toward parental-type regulations in some
areas of campus life.

Laudicina and Tramutola {1974),

while acknowledging the abandonment of in loco
parentis, wrote that "it should be noted that students
may at times seek a return to the in loco parentis
concept where it is of special advantage to them" (p.
7), e.g. preferring more lenient campus regulations to
stricter community regulations.
While the democratization of the campus was once
viewed as an alternative to an administrating
oligarchy, Levine (1986), citing a survey by the
Carnegie Foundation, indicated that students were not
eager to participate in institutional governance.
Students were found to be more focused on career
success in the post-college environment rather than the
college environment itself.
Fass (1986) cited student attitude surveys and
campus reports that indicated a growing willingness to
support rules, regulations, and restrictions on
individual behavior when such actions were believed to
be in the best interest of the college community.
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By the end of the 1980s, it appeared that in loco
parentis was on the verge of resurfacing as many
campuses began to reconsider one legacy of the 1960s,
the abandonment of in loco parentis rules (Rachin,
1989).
Collison (1989) wrote that 20 years after the
decline of in loco parentis, some colleges and
universities were again tightening restrictions on
dormitory residents.

While some students oppose the

new policies, others who are concerned about crime,
alcohol abuse, and live-in guests are in favor of the
regulations.
While in loco parentis as an overt form of
governance may have gone by the wayside, many policies
and procedures associated with it may still be applied
in the absence of viable alternatives.

Boyer (1990)

stated:
There was a time when college leaders felt
responsible not only for the nurturing of the
students' intellectual life, but for the
guardianship of their morality as well. The
problem today is that while rigid rule making has
been abolished, no theory of campus governance has
been discovered to replace it.
(p. A32)
Government requirements may also help to revive a
form of in loco parentis at public institutions.
Laudicina and Tramutola (1974) indicated that there
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were a number of cases in which parents complained that
their children were allowed to become drug users while
attending college.

Such claims were dismissed, in

keeping with the weakening of in loco parentis.

By the

1980s, the Reagan Administration sought to link federal
funding with institutional efforts to discourage drug
use by students.

Curris (1990) stated that there were

efforts to alter the university-student relationship as
a result of the national crackdown on drugs, and that
it seemed that the student-as-adult trend was reversing
itself.

According to Curris, "(The university is)

moving in the direction of greater control over student
life (p. El}.
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Thomas (1991) wrote that colleges and universities
are faced with newly defined legal duties and
responsibilities.

The response by some institutions to

these obligations is not necessarily a return to an
absolute in loco parentis, but does represent a step
back from the freedoms given to students since the
1960s.
Conclusion
The history of American higher education reveals
that in the in loco parentis doctrine has gone from
defining the relationship between student and
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institution to being declared legally dead.

The

question remains, however, if there will ever be a
revival.

Certainly, a reappearance of in loco

parentis in its original form is highly unlikely.
There are, however, many influences acting on
institutions of higher education which may awaken an
alternative in loco parentis.

Some contend that such a

reawakening has already taken place.
For the greater portion of the history of higher
education in America, the in loco parentis doctrine was
the expedient choice of institutions.

The

establishment of policies and regulations, their
implementation, and their enforcement was under the
sole discretion of the administration.
be made in clear-cut terms.

Decisions could

Questions of

constitutionality, along with their inherent ambiguity,
could be ignored.
In his essay Civil Disobedience, Henry David
Thoreau heartily accepted the motto that the government
that governs least, governs best.

During the 1960s the

spirit of Thoreau infused an increasing number of
students who heartily accepted the motto that the
institution that regulates least, regulates best.

The

potential for chaos in the absence of regulations meant
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that the demands of these students would ultimately be
tempered.
Recent years have seen a variety of factors
influence the reassertion of institutional control.

In

the absence of coherent theories of governance,
institutions are open to the expediency of in loco
parentis, albeit in modified forms.
As long as institutions perceive a need to govern
students, are faced with legal responsibilities, and/or
pursue an agenda of student development, the issue of
how to meet these obligations will be debated.

Given

the complexities of today's higher education
environment, the relationship between the student and
institution will continue to be redefined for some time
to come.
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